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This paper statistically reexamines the conventional view that the main bank 
relationship has been an important element of corporate governance in Japan. According 
to the view, in postwar Japan, the main bank relationship has contributed to efficient 
management of borrower firms in place of the capital market that disciplines corporate 
management in the Anglo-American economy. Our analysis finds that neither the main 
bank relationship nor other capital market factors, which the standard governance 
theory regards as important determinants of managerial efficiency, consistently 
influenced efficiency of manufacturing firms’ management defined by the total factor 
productivity (TFP). Instead, market competition, particularly competitive pressures 
from abroad, is found to have consistently enhanced management efficiency. Thus, the 
conventional view exaggerates importance of the main bank relationship in the Japanese 
corporate governance framework.   
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 11. Introduction 
     Banks mobilize financial resources from savers via bank deposits that are liquid 
stores of value functioning as an essential instrument of the payment system. Banks also 
allocate funds to fund-users (mainly firms) by examining or monitoring their credibility. 
They realize economies of scale both by pooling funds from a large number of savors 
and by diversifying loan portfolios. Banks are regarded as being delegated by a large 
number of small savors to economize on monitoring costs (Diamond (1984)). No doubt, 
they play an important role in a market economy. In particular, at the early stages of 
industrial development where efficient monitors are badly needed, banks are believed to 
stimulate rapid industrial developments (Gerschenkron (1962)). This is true of Japan in 
the postwar era (i.e., the so-called high growth period from the late 1950s to the early 
1970s). The warfare destroyed Japan’s production capacity, and the occupation army’s 
policy of resolving the zaibatsu groups immediately after Word War II fundamentally 
changed structure of capital markets increasing importance of banking sector in the 
Japanese corporate finance (Okazaki (1996)). Postwar Japan apparently achieved a 
‘miraculous’ industrial development under the bank-centered financial system. 
     Some scholars go so far as to argue that banks were important in postwar Japan 
not because they constituted a simple conduit between ultimate savers and investors but 
because they were essential to the corporate governance. According to their view, banks 
monitored and disciplined management of borrower firms via intimate long-term 
relationships with the firms. This long-term relationship is often called ‘the main bank 
relationship.’ The main bank relationship is based not only on a standard loan contract 
but also on a cross shareholding between banks and their client firms. Banks sometimes 
dispatched officers to borrower firms, particularly when they were in financial difficulty. 
The bank officers would intervene in the management and play an active role in 
restructuring of these firms. From a theoretical perspective, the main bank relationship 
could be regarded as a sort of state-contingent contract under which corporate managers 
are allowed a lot of latitude in controlling business when business shows normal 
profitability, but the control right would be swiftly transferred from managers to banks 
in the case of financial distress. This bank-based mechanism is regarded as having 
exerted the same disciplinary influence on Japan’s corporate management as the capital 
market has done in the U.S. corporate governance framework (e.g., Prowse (1995)). 
This view concerning functions of the bank-centered financial system has been so 
prevalent that we will call it the conventional view. The voluminous book edited by 
 2Aoki and Patrick (1994) contributes to circulation of the conventional view.
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     The non-performing loan problem that surfaced in the 1990s has shaken the 
function of Japan’s bank-centered financial system. A number of banks went bankrupt 
due to a shortage of capital. The remaining banks have been forced to take a 
conservative attitude toward credit supply in order to recover their capital bases. This 
conservatism of banks seems to have broken the traditional intimate relationships 
between banks and firms. Banks and other financial institutions reportedly abandoned 
the policy of cross shareholding with client firms by selling shares of those firms (e.g., 
Nikkei Shimbun, December 28, 1999).
2  
     The ‘main bank relationship’ has been closely correlated with the financial 
‘keiretsu’ based on the big city banks’ network with their client firms. The mergers 
between the big city banks announced in quick succession since 1999 are, however, 
expected to obfuscate the landscape of the financial ‘keiretsu.’ If, as the conventional 
view claims, banks have been essential for efficient corporate management in the 
Japanese corporate governance framework, those changes in the financial system caused 
by the bank crisis will endanger the efficiency of the industrial sector. The recent 
prolongation of economic depression may have something to do with the malfunction of 
the banking sector. 
     However, is the conventional view valid? The miserable performance of banks 
observed during the last decade casts doubt on the hypothesis that banks are excellent 
corporate governance monitors. For example, we cite the case of jyusen. These were 
non-bank finance companies specializing in mortgage loans. These companies were 
established by groups of major banks. The major owners of those companies were big 
Japanese banks. Moreover, these companies borrowed a large amount of funds from 
their mother banks to supply mortgage loans related to real estate developments and 
housing. Quite intimate personnel relationships existed between jyusen and their mother 
banks. Thus, the mother banks were nothing but the main banks of the jyusen companies. 
Nevertheless, the banks failed to discipline the managers of those companies. All the 
                                                  
1  In the corporate governance envisaged by the conventional view, how banks are 
disciplined for efficient management is an open issue. Aoki (1994) argues that the 
traditional personnel relationships prevailing between the regulatory authorities, 
particularly the Ministry of Finance, and banks via so-called amakudari practices have 
resolved this issue. Horiuchi and Shimizu (2000), however, criticize this argument. 
2    According to the figures estimated by Nissei Kiso-Kenkyusho (1999), the percentage 
of inter-corporate shareholding decreased 21.5% to 16.0% during the period from 1987 
to 1998. In particular, the banks’ relative presence in the cross shareholding decreased 
by more than a half from 6.7% to 3.2% during the same period. 
 3jyusen companies were liquidated in 1995 due to the huge amount of non-performing 
loans. Public funds were injected in the liquidation process to dispose their 
non-performing loans. 
     Needless  to  say,  the  recent  bank  crisis in itself is not the definite evidence to deny 
the constructive role of banks assumed by the conventional view. Similarly, the 
remarkable industrial growth attained under the bank-centered financial system does not 
necessarily mean that the bank relationships contributed to efficient management of 
industrial firms. We need a statistical examination to confirm the validity of the 
conventional view. The purpose of this paper is to statistically test the conventional 
view that the main bank relationship increased managerial efficiency of industrial firms 
in Japan. 
 
     P r i o r   r e s e a r c h : There are many empirical studies tackling this issue. Almost all of 
them analyze relationships between managerial efficiency and various factors observed 
in the financial and capital markets. For example, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 
(1991) find that the ‘keiretsu’ relationship significantly reduces liquidity constraints on 
firms’ investment expenditures in the Tobin’s Q type investment function.
3  The 
liquidity constraint is considered as an outcome of the agency problem associated with 
firms’ external financing (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988)). Thus, this result is 
interpreted as evidence that the main bank relationship is effective in mitigating the 
agency problem. Prowse (1992) argues that the block holding by financial institutions 
including banks effectively disciplines corporate management, thereby increasing the 
book value of profits of the client firms. Lichtenberg and Pushner (1994) confirm 
Prowse’s argument by finding a significantly positive relationship between banks’ 
shareholding and increments in total factor productivity of borrower firms. Thus, most 
empirical studies support the conventional view.   
          But there remains some ambiguity. For example, by consistently treating financial 
data of the sampled companies, Hayashi (2000) obtains results contradicting the 
conclusion of Hoshi et al. (1991).
4  We should also point out that the book value of 
profits is quite elusive because the accounting values of assets and other items are from 
time to time divergent from their economic values, and because there is some room for 
                                                  
3  The ‘keiretsu’ groups were formed based on the relationship between non-financial 
firms and major banks and affiliated non-bank financial institutions. Thus, in the 
following we will regard the main bank relationship as interchangeable with ‘keiretsu’ 
groups.   
4    Kaplan and Zingales (1997) reexamine Fazzari et al. (1988) to obtain results 
 4managers to window dress for profitability. Higher accounting profits do not necessarily 
mean a higher level of managerial efficiency. If the capital market were truly efficient, 
the Tobin’s Q would be a sufficient statistics. However, the Japanese capital market 
seems to have been far from efficient. It is rather doubtful whether the Tobin’s Q 
approach adopted by Hoshi et al. (1991) is a reliable method to measure managerial 
efficiency of Japanese firms.   
     We follow Lichtenberg and Pushner (1994) by using total factor productivity 
(TFP) to measure firms’ managerial efficiency. But in this paper we also emphasize 
importance of market competition, which is neglected by Lichtenberg and Pushner 
(1994). We should not confine our attention to the factors related to the financial-capital 
market when considering mechanisms of corporate governance. As Nickell, Nicolitsas, 
and Dryden (1997) point out, market competition disciplines a firm’s managers because 
it will weed out an inefficiently managed firm. Nickell et al. (1997) conclude market 
competition contributes to efficient management in the U.K. industry. We follow this 
analysis to include factors representing the degree of market competition in our 
empirical analysis in addition to the factors related to the financial-capital market. We 
find that the competitive pressure measured by the degree of exposure to global markets 
has been consistently important in disciplining Japanese manufacturing firms. In 
contrast to this, the main bank relationship did not contribute to efficient management of 
the manufacturing firms. Other factors such as the ownership structure and debt burdens, 
which the theory of corporate governance usually considers important, do not influence 
corporate management in a systematic way. Although the empirical study in this paper is 
tentative, the results suggest that the conventional view exaggerates the contribution of 




2.  Productivity Growth in Manufacturing 
     The following empirical analyses are based on financial statistics from 1,661 
manufacturing firms from 1956 (fiscal year) to 1996 (fiscal year). All firms are either 
listed on stock exchanges or registered in the OTC market. We exclude those firms 
whose financial statements include abnormal figures for various reasons from our 
sample. Since the time span of a sampled firm depends on when the firm was listed on a 
stock exchange or registered in the OTC market, the number of sampled firms changes 
                                                                                                                                                  
contradicting the liquidity constraints hypothesis. 
 5over time. Due to its huge size, it was impossible to analyze the data set as a whole by 
the PANEL method. We divide the sample period into four sub-periods: i.e., 1957-1970, 
1971-1980, 1981-1990, and 1991-1996. The number of sampled firms in each period is 
presented in Table 1. 
          Figure 1 shows the annual growth rate in real value-added (RVAD) of the sampled 
manufacturing firms from 1957 to 1996. From the late 1950s to the first half of the 
1970s, the RVAD grew on the average at higher than 15% per year. On the other hand, 
both labor input and capital increased at only a few percent per year during the period 
(Table 1).
5    The increases in these inputs cannot account for the high growth in the real 
value added (RVAD) in manufacturing. This suggests that the total factor productivity of 
the Japanese manufacturing industry was extremely high during the high growth era. Is 
this high growth rate attributable to financial factors such as the main bank relationship? 
This is one question to be answered in this paper. 
     Since  the mid-1970s, the growth  rate  in RVAD tended to decline. The average of 
RVAD growth rate was 8.5% during the 1980s and 2.4% during the period from 1991 to 
1996 respectively. Although growth rates in labor and capital inputs decreased during 
these periods, they do not account for a sharp decline that the RVAD in manufacturing 
showed. Can we explain this by means of financial factors? This is another question in 
this paper. 
 
     A  basic  production  function: A firm i is assumed to produce RVAD Vi(t) at t-year 
following a Cobb-Douglas type production function: 
 
        V i (t) = Ti (t) Ki (t)
 ai Li (t)
(1-ai),                                     ( 1 )  
                                                  
5  The real capital of a firm is estimated in the following way. First, we estimate real 
investment It of each firm by deflating its nominal amount of investment expenditure by 
the nonresidential investment deflator provided by the EPA’s national income statistics. 
The obsolescence rate of real capital dt for each industry is estimated from the data in 
the EPA’s Annual Report on Capital Stock of Private Enterprises. Assuming that the 
obsolescence rate of real capital is common to all the firms in an industry, we estimate a 
time series of real capital for each firm by making use of both It and dt. This method 
produces estimated growth rates in real capital substantially lower than those estimated 
by the EPA. For example, the EPA estimates the annual average growth rate in real 
capital to be 5.3% for the period of 1978-1986, whereas according to our method the 
corresponding figure is 0.6%. Thus, our method seems to underrate the real capital 
growth. However, the EPA’s estimate may be overrated, because the average annual 
growth rate in real capital estimated by Hayashi and Inoue (1991) for the same time 
period is 3.1% much lower than the EPA’s estimate. We do not think our method of 
estimating real capital distorts the following analysis in this paper. 
 6where Ki(t), Li(t), and Ti(t) are respectively real capital input, the number of employees, 
and the total factor productivity (TFP) at the t-year. The technological parameter of the 
production function is represented by ai, which is assumed to be variable cross industry 
but common for firms belonging to the same industry. The growth rate of per capita 
RVAD [d(Vi(t)/Li(t))/dt]/(Vi(t)/Li(t)) can be represented by the growth rate in the 
capital-labor ratio [d(Ki(t)/Li(t))/dt]/(Ki(t)/Li(t)) and the growth rate in TFP 
[dTi(t)/dt]/Ti(t) in the following way: 
 
         [ d ( V i(t)/Li(t))/dt]/(Vi(t)/Li(t))  
                   =   a i[d(Ki(t)/Li(t))/dt]/(Ki(t)/ Li(t)) + [dTi(t)/dt]/Ti( t ) .         ( 2 )  
 
In the following, we investigate how various factors related to the capital markets and 
market competition influence efficiency of a firm’s management that is measured by the 
growth rate of TFP. 
 
 
3.  Factors of Corporate Governance 
          We assume the TFP growth of a firm to depend on its managerial efficiency. Then, 
we look at candidate variables that, according to the standard theory of corporate 
governance, are supposed to influence on management efficiency. Specifically, we note 
the ownership structure of a firm, the debt burden, and the degree of market competition 
to which the firm is exposed.   
 
     C a p i t a l  m a r k e t  f a c t o r s : The theory of corporate governance emphasizes the 
importance of the existence of large shareholders who are motivated to monitor 
management of their firms. The diversified shareholding deprives investors of an 
incentive to monitor management, and thereby reducing disciplinary effect of the capital 
market. We present the degree of ownership concentration by the proportion of shares 
held by largest twelve shareholders OWNER. The standard theory expects OWNER to 
be positively related to efficiency of corporate management. Financial institutions 
including banks are regarded as important monitors of corporate management due to 
their specialty of analyzing information and data concerning management. We may 
assume that the proportion of shares held by financial institutions FINST is positively 
correlated to the efficiency of corporate management measured by the growth rate of 
per capita RVAD. We also add the proportions of shares held by non-financial 
companies CORP, by foreigners FOREIGN, and by private personals PERSON. 
 7     Some scholars argue that the cross shareholding prevailing in the Japanese 
corporate sector is effective in mitigating agency problems associated with transactions 
between firms (Berglof and Perotti (1994)). Some others claim that the cross 
shareholding works to enhance the autonomy of corporate managers from the capital 
market discipline and endangers efficient management (Lichtenberg and Pushner 
(1994)). We add CORP to the set of explanatory variables to examine which argument is 
empirically supported. Foreign ownership in the Japanese companies increased 
gradually but steadily during the decade from the mid-1970s. And after a short break 
during the bubble period of the late 1980’s foreign investment has regained this upward 
trend. Foreign investors are sometimes regarded as having different investment targets 
than domestic investors in the sense that foreigners tend to give priority to profitability 
over the size of the business or relationships with other companies. If it is true, the 
relative shares held by foreign investors is expected to positively influence managerial 
efficiency. 
     According to Jensen (1986) and (1989), debt has a disciplinary impact on 
corporate management, because managers are forced to pursue efficient management in 
order to repay debt constantly. If freed from the debt burden, they will indulge 
themselves in seeking perquisites. Jensen (1989) suggests that the Japanese firms were 
effectively disciplined during the high growth period because they maintained a high 
level of leverage. He went so far as to predict that the declining tendency in firms’ 
dependence on debt financing (Table 1) would endanger efficient management in Japan. 
Actually, the TFP growth rate decreased since the late 1970s. Was the Jensen’s 
prediction realized? In order to catch this disciplinary influence of debt burden, we add 
the debt-total asset ratio DEBT to the set of explanatory variables. 
 
     Market competition: We try to measure the degree of market competition a firm 
faces by three indexes. The first one is the proportion of sales occupied by the top five 
firms (SALE) in a specific industry. Thus a lower SALE implies a higher degree of 
market competition in the industry. However, the contestable market hypothesis 
(Baumol, Panzar and Willing (1982)) shows that the higher market concentration of 
sales does not necessarily mean a higher degree of monopoly. Thus, it is ambiguous 
whether SALE is a reliable measure of monopoly in a specific industry. 
     An alternative to SALE is excess profits. As Nickell et al. (1997) argue, higher 
excess profits imply that the industry is less competitive. We interpret the industry 
average of return on total assets (RETURN) as a proxy variable for excess profit. Thus, 
the higher RETURN implies the higher excess profits and the higher degree of 
 8monopoly in the industry. To control for variation in nominal interest rates over time, 
we use RETURN less the long-term interest rate on government bonds as a variable in 
our statistical analysis. However, it is well known the book value of return is elusive. 
Corporate managers who enjoy monopolistic positions could manipulate the returns by 
diverting resources to useless or less profitable ends. In this case, return on total assets 
is not a good measure of the degree of monopoly within an industry. 
     Another alternative to SALE is the degree of exposure of firms to global 
competition. The Japanese government started the policy of liberalizing trade for 
manufacturing in the early 1960s. The Japanese manufacturing firms had to face rather 
fierce competition from abroad due to this opening up policy. We define the degree of 
exposure to global competition of a specific industry by the sum of the import 
penetration ratio (imports/(domestic production + imports – exports)) and the export 




     The main bank relationship: Since the long-term relationship between firms and 
banks are mostly based on implicit contracts, it is not always easy to identify a main 
bank for a specific firm. The multi-dimensional function of Japanese banks makes the 
identification more difficult. This paper classifies the sampled firms into the group of 
those that keep ‘stable main bank relationships’ with banks. We consulted the Keizai 
Chosa-kyokai’s Study on the Keiretsu to identify the names of main banks for individual 
firms. The group of firms with stable main bank relationship is defined as those firms 
that did not change their main banks from 1975 to 1996 at all. On the other hand, we 
define the firms with ‘unstable main bank relationship’ as the firms that changed their 
main banks more than three times during the period or whose main banks cannot be 
identified. As has been explained, our sample excludes some firms due to abnormality 
of their financial statistics, and sample spans of individual firms are variable in the 
original data base. Thus, the numbers of firms belonging to categories of those with 
‘stable main bank relationship’ and those with unstable main bank relationship are 
changeable over the sample period (Table 2). For instance, 465 firms are defined as 
firms with stable main bank relationships and 268 firms are defined as firms with 
unstable main bank relationships in the first sub-period (1957-1970). Other firms are 
                                                  
6  Articles investigating the relationship between the import penetration rate in an 
industry and the productivity of a firm belonging to the industry includes Nickell, 
Wadhwani, and Wall (1992), Nickell, Nicolitsas, and Dryden (1997), Harrison (1994), 
and MacDonald (1994). 
 9ambiguous with respect to the main bank relationship. It is a little surprising how many 
firms are ambiguous in terms of their main bank relationships. 
     Table 2 compares averages of relevant variables of the firms with stable main 
banks relationship with those of the firms with unstable main bank relationship in four 
time periods: i.e., 1956-1970, 1971-1980, 1981-1990, and 1991-1996. The annual 
growth rate in real value added (RVAD) is a little higher (but not significantly so) for 
the ‘unstable main bank firms’ than for the ‘stable main bank firms.’ The DEBT figures 
show that the firms with an unstable main bank relationship were less dependent on 
debt than those with a stable main bank relationship. While financial institutions’ 
ownership was larger in the case of firms with a stable main bank relationship than in 
the case of firms with an unstable main bank relationship, non-financial firms hold 
larger stakes in the latter firms than in the former firms. In the following, we test 
whether a main bank relationship enhances efficiency of corporate management in 
comparison to an unstable one. 
 
 
4.  Results of Statistical Tests 
     We  test  some  hypotheses  regarding  the influence of the main bank relationship on 
managerial efficiency of individual firms by the PANEL analysis (the random effects 
method). Specifically, the following three questions are examined:   
(1)  Was the main bank relationship effective in raising the efficiency of corporate 
management measured in terms of growth rates in TFP? 
(2)  Was the main bank relationship a substitute for the various disciplinary factors of 
the capital market that have often been reported to be observed in the U.S. and the 
U.K.?  
(3)  Was the main bank relationship effective in improving performance of the firms in 
financial distress? 
 
4.1 Did the main bank relationship enhance managerial efficiency in manufacturing? 
     Our  first  model  to  explain  the growth rate in per capita RVAD is 
 
        [ d ( V i(t)/Li(t))/dt]/(Vi(t)/Li(t)) 
      =   a i [(dKi(t)/dt)/Ki(t) – (dLi(t)/dt)/Li(t)] + bi Xi(t) + ci Yi(t) 
        +   d i MAINi + ei DI(t) + ui( t )                                      ( 3 )  
 
where Xi(t) is a vector of explanatory variables related to market competition in the 
 10industry to which this firm belongs, Yi(t) is a vector containing explanatory variables 
related to capital market discipline, DI(t) is a diffusion index to control the cyclical 
movement in the growth rate in (Vi(t)/Li(t)), and MAINi is a dummy variable taking one 
if the firm has the stable main bank relationship and taking zero otherwise. Assuming 
the technical parameter ai is invariant across firms within the same industry, we use 
cross terms of [(dKi(t)/dt)/Ki(t) - (dLi(t)/dt)/Li(t)] and industry dummies in our PANEL 
analysis. We are interested in whether MAINi has significantly positive coefficient, and 
whether there are any variables related to either market competition or capital market 
discipline that significantly account for the growth rate in per capita value added. In 
order to economize space, we present t-statistics of relevant explanatory variables (i.e., 
Xi(t), Yi(t), and MAINi) in Table 3.
7 
     Table 3 shows that MAINi did not positively influence the growth rate in per 
capital real value added (or TFP) at all for all sub-periods. In the third sub-period (the 
period during the 1980s), MAINi negatively correlated to TFP. This result suggests that 
the main bank relationship did not enhance the managerial efficiency of manufacturing 
firms. In contrast to this, EXIMi(t) positively correlated with TFP growth for all 
sub-periods. Although the data on FOREIGNi is not available for the first period, it also 
positively correlated with the growth rate in TFP from the second to the third period.   
     RETURN also positively influenced TFP growth in all the sub-periods. If this 
variable truly represents the degree of monopoly in each industry, the result suggests 
market competition did not contribute to managerial efficiency, which contradicts with 
both what the EXIM results suggest above and what Nickell et al. (1997) found for the 
U.K. industry. As has already been explained, however, accounting profits are elusive. 
The firms with low returns on total assets may be those in which insiders manipulate 
profits for the benefit of themselves at the expense of outside investors. If so, this result 
does not necessarily contradict what the results of EXIM show. 
     Other variables related to capital market discipline did not show significant 
influence on TFP growth in a consistent way. For example, DEBTi positively influenced 
TFP growth in the first and fourth sub-periods. This seems consistent with what Jensen 
(1989) predicts. But this result was not obtained for the second and third sub-periods. 
Except for FOREIGNi, no variables related to ownership structure correlate with TFP 
growth rate in a consistent way.
8  In sum, our PANEL analysis of equation (3) gave a 
                                                  
7  The variables of ownership structure are closely related with each other. In order to 
avoid multicollinearity, we separately estimated an equation containing only one 
variable of ownership structure. 
8   Lichtenberg and Pushner (1994) find positive influence of ownership by financial 
 11negative answer to the question of whether the main bank relationship enhanced 
managerial efficiency in manufacturing. 
 
4.2 Was the main bank a substitute for the capital market? 
     The conventional view claims that the main bank relationship has been a 
substitute for the capital market in disciplining corporate managers. For example, 
according to this view, hostile takeovers often observed in both the U.S. and the U.K. is 
unnecessary in Japan, because banks have exerted similar disciplinary pressures on 
managers of client firms via long-term relationships. In the following, we test the 
validity of this view. 
     Specifically, we estimate the following equation regarding the growth rate in per 
capital RVAD for two groups of the sampled firms: those with a stable main bank 
relationship and those with an unstable main bank relationship: 
 
        [ d ( V i(t)/Li(t))/dt]/(Vi(t)/Li(t)) 
      =   a i [(dKi(t)/dt)/Ki(t) – (dLi(t)/dt)/Li(t)] + bi Xi(t) + ci Yi(t) 
        +   e i DI(t) + ui( t ) ,                                               ( 4 )  
 
Notation is the same as formulation (3). We have already compared some performance 
variables of the two groups in Table 2. We test whether estimated parameters bi’s and 
ci’s are significantly different between these two groups of sampled firms. In order to 
avoid the difficulty of heteroscedasticity between the two groups, we make use of a 
two-stage estimation method. First, we estimate equation (4) for the two groups 
separately to obtain variances of disturbance ui(t) of the respective sample groups. Then, 
after adjusting data by utilizing estimated variances in disturbance terms of the two 
groups, we estimated the following equation for the pooled sample of the two groups: 
 
        [ d ( V i(t)/Li(t))/dt]/(Vi(t)/Li(t)) 
      =   a i [(dKi(t)/dt)/Ki(t) – (dLi(t)/dt)/Li(t)] + (1+bi
’MAINi)biXi(t)  
             +   ( 1 + c i
’MAINi)ciYi(t)+ ei DI(t) + vi( t )                         ( 5 )  
 
where, as have already been explained, MAINi is a dummy variable representing the 
stable main bank relationship. We are interested in whether the cross terms MAINi･Xi(t) 
                                                                                                                                                  
institutions and negative influence of non-financial firms’ ownership on managerial 
efficiency. However, our analysis did not produce the same results. 
 12and MAINi･Yi(t) are statistically significant.
9  
     Table  4  summarizes  results  of  the  estimations. The figures in the lowest line show 
F statistics of the null hypothesis that all the coefficient of cross terms MAINi･Xi(t) and 
MAINi･Yi(t) are zero. According to Table 4, the null hypothesis is not rejected except 
for the second sub-period (i.e., the period of the 1970s). For the third period, the cross 
term MAINi･EXIMi is negatively significant. This suggests that the main bank 
relationship has worked to mitigate competitive pressures on management from global 
markets in this sample period. On the other hand, the cross term MAINi･Yi(t) are 
insignificant for all periods except for FOREIGN in the second sub-period (equation 
(2)). Overall, the F-statistics does not reject the null hypothesis that the main bank 
relationship did not change relation between the capital market parameters Yi (t) and the 
growth rate in per capita RVAD. 
     We  can  confirm  the  significance of the cross terms between MAINi and individual 
variables related to the capital market Yi(t) by examining their t-statistics. Table 4 shows 
that the cross term MAINi･FOREIGNi is negatively significant for the second 
sub-period. But it is insignificant both in the third and the fourth sub-period. The cross 
term MAINi･DEBTi is not significant at all for all sub-periods. 
     Thus, the statistical test regarding substitutability between the main bank 
relationship and the capital market mechanisms with respect to corporate governance 
leads to a rather negative conclusion against the conventional view. We have been 
unable to find consistent evidence supporting the view that the main bank relationship 
has been able to replace capital market discipline and has a positive influence on 
management efficiency of client firms. 
 
4.3 How did the main bank relationship influence firms in distress? 
     Some scholars argue that the main bank is particularly important when its client 
firm gets into managerial trouble (Sheard (1994)). The main bank intervenes into the 
firm’s management to press incumbent managers for restructuring of the business and 
successfully forces the firm to reduce debt (Kim and Limpaphayom (1998)). The 
intervention of the main bank is so constructive that the performance of client firms 
tend to recover more quickly than those firms that recover from financial distress 
without help of a main bank (Hoshi, Kashyap, and scharfstein (1990)). However, the 
financial distress of a firm triggers a transfer of control right from the current managers 
to the creditors under the standard debt contract. Does the main bank relationship have 
                                                  
9   This method is justified only if the disturbance vi(t) in equation (5) follows the 
normal distribution. We assume this is the case in this paper. 
 13any special meaning for firms in financial distress? 
     In order to investigate this issue, we selected up firms in financial distress from 
our original sample. First, we consulted Directory of Japanese Companies History 
(Nihon Kaisha-shi Soran) published by Toyokeizai Shimpo-sha to identify firms that 
experienced a management crisis during the sample period. Then, from the group of 
these firms, we selected those that have shown negative net wealth as the firms of 
financial distress. By this method, we identified a little less than one hundred firms in 
financial distress for each sub-period. Table 5 compares performance of the distressed 
firms with that of other firms. The distressed firms showed lower growth rates in RVAD 
and larger debt-total asset ratio DEBT than other firms did. But the other performance 
criteria of the distressed firms are not greatly different from those of other firms. 
     We divide the firms in financial distress into two groups: the firms with a stable 
main bank relationship and the firms with an unstable main bank relationship. Table 5 
also compares performances of these two groups. We should be careful not to derive any 
definite conclusion from this comparison based on a small sample. But the firms with an 
unstable main bank relationship appeared to have a greater growth rate in RVAD than 
the firms with a stable main bank relationship both in the first and in the second sub 
period. We tested the influence of the main bank relationship on management 
governance of firms in financial distress based on the sample of these two groups by the 
same statistical methods adopted in the previous section. The results are summarized in 
Table 6. According to Table 6, there is no evidence to show that the main bank 
relationship significantly changed governance structure for the firms in financial 
distress. Thus, the conventional view regarding the main bank functions is not supported 
even here. 
 
4.4 How did financial deregulation influence governance mechanisms? 
     The Japanese government started to deregulate the financial system at the 
beginning of the 1980s. In spite of the apparent deregulation, however, financial 
authorities continued to intervene in financial markets mainly in order to keep the 
financial system’s status quo established in the high growth era (Hamada and Horiuchi 
(1987), and Hanazaki and Horiuchi (1998)). Thus, it is ambiguous whether the 
deregulation changed the basic characteristics of Japan’s bank-centered financial system 
during the 1980s. Nevertheless, it is an interesting question whether the deregulation 
since the early 1980s changed the main bank’s influence in the corporate governance 
framework. Mayer (1988) predicts that financial deregulation would give firms 
alternative means of fund raising to bank loans, which would undermine effectiveness 
 14of long-term relationships between banks and firms. Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz 
(1996) argue that the full-scale competition induced by the financial deregulation 
deprives traditional banking of the rents that was important in disciplining banks for 
efficient monitoring in the corporate governance. Do our statistical tests find any 
influence of the financial deregulation on the effectiveness of the main bank relationship 
as those scholars argue? 
     The statistics summarized in Table 3 and 4 shows that contribution of the main 
bank relationship to managerial efficiency was not observed since the late 1950s, not 
having been eclipsed since the 1980s when the financial deregulation was started. The 
huge size of the database prevents a formal test of structural changes over the sample 
period in estimated production functions such as equation (3). Here, we take up the 
three truncated sample periods of the early 1970s (1971-74), the early 1980s (1981-84), 
and the late 1980s (1985-1989) to test structural changes in estimated functions. Due to 
limitations on data availability, the estimated equation has only limited number of 
explanatory variables related to the ownership structure. The results are summarized in 
Table 7. (In order to avoid difficulty of heteroscedasticity, we adopted two-stage PANEL 
estimation.) The F-value in each column presents a result of F-test of the null hypothesis 
that the structure of the estimated equation is invariant between the two truncated 
sample periods. We can confirm which explanatory variable changes its explanation 
power significantly over the two periods by using t-statistics for the cross term between 
the variable and a dummy variable assigned to a specific sample period. 
     The result shows that the main bank dummy is powerless in explaining TFP 
growth as before. According to F-values in Table 7, however, there was a significant 
structural change in the estimated TFP function between the early 1970s when the 
financial deregulation was not started, and either the early 1980s or the late 1980s when 
the government liberalized the financial system to some extent. But these results do not 
indicate a significant influence of deregulation on the financial side of corporate 
governance, because t-statistics for the cross terms between financial variables and a 
dummy of the truncated sample period show no significant breaks. In other words, the 
structural changes in the estimated equations were caused not by the financial 
deregulation in the 1980s but by changes in the technological conditions and in the 
influence of market competition. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
     Japanese manufacturing achieved remarkably high productivity growth in the 
 15postwar period. According to our empirical study, neither growth in productive inputs 
nor factors related to the financial system can fully account for this good performance. 
Our empirical analysis did not find clear-cut evidence to support the conventional view 
that the main bank relationship has enhanced efficient management in the Japanese 
corporate governance framework. Our result is in a sharp contrast to what have been 
argued by many preceding researchers who emphasized the effectiveness of the 
bank-centered financial system in promoting industrial development.   
       On the other hand, this paper found that the market competition measured by the 
degree of exposure of an industry to global markets has consistently contributed to 
efficient corporate management in Japan’s manufacturing. Although the magnitude of 
its contribution is not enough to explain the high growth in manufacturing productivity, 
this result is suggestive. The Japanese government adopted the policy of liberalizing 
trade mainly in the manufacturing sectors as of the early 1960s. Since then 
manufacturing firms have had to face fierce international competition. They have often 
been forced to restructure their business in order to survive global competition. Thus, 
market competition has disciplined managers of Japan’s manufacturing firms and 
helped ensure efficient management. As Frankel and Romer (1999) show, international 
trade stimulates economic growth. Our analysis suggests that this positive impact of 
international trade comes from its disciplinary effect on corporate management. 
     In contrast to this, the financial service industries including banking have been 
protected from full-scale competition by the government policy for long time. The 
disciplinary influence of market competition has been absent from the financial service 
industries. As long as the competition-restricting regulation was effective to give 
existing financial institutions a handsome amount of profits, the inefficiency in the 
financial system did not become obvious. However, the structural changes in corporate 
finance started at the 1980s made the competition-restricting regulation less and less 
effective. Finally, the inefficiency of the financial system was revealed in the form of a 
serious non-performing loan problem in the banking sector (Hanazaki and Horiuchi 
(1998)). 
     Thus, the empirical analysis in this paper suggests that the conventional view 
exaggerates the importance of banks in the Japanese framework of corporate 
governance. The recent bank crisis is disturbing because banks have been unable to 
smoothly respond to the industrial sectors’ demand for liquidity. But the analysis of this 
paper suggests that the banking crisis does not exert bad influence on the corporate 
governance mechanisms in contrast to what the conventional view would expect.   

































 17Table 1: Main statistics of sampled firms (annual averages per period) 
  1956-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990  19991-1996 
No of firms  959 962 1,347  1,579
RVAD  17.8 (23.0) 10.1 (27.5)   8.5 (22.6)    2.4 (17.7)
LABOR    3.9 (10.2) -1.0 ( 8.0)   0.4 ( 5.9)  -0.3 ( 5.5)
CAPITAL    3.1 ( 6.8)   2.4 ( 7.0)   1.6 ( 6.7)    1.7 ( 7.8)
SALE  76.3 (20.0) 54.0 (19.0) 59.9 (20.7)  61.2 (21.3)
RETURN    3.2 ( 3.0)   0.4 ( 2.9)   1.0 ( 2.3)    0.4 ( 2.2)
EXIM  15.1 ( 7.9) 19.5 (12.0)  21.4 (14.4)
DEBT  69.1 (14.2) 72.2 (17.7) 64.3 (19.3)  57.3 (19.6)
OWNER  48.7 (15.1) 48.8 (13.8)  50.2 (14.2)
FOREIGN    2.7 ( 7.5)   4.7 ( 8.2)    5.3 ( 8.3)
FINST  30.7 (15.6)  30.6 (15.7)
CORP  30.7 (18.8)  31.4 (18.3)
PERSON  31.6 (15.0)  31.2 (15.7)
(Notes) RVAD: the annual growth rate of real value added. LABOR: the annual growth 
rate of employees. CAPITAL: the annual growth rate in real capital. (We estimate real 
capital stock of a firm at each year based on the depreciation rates published by the 
EPA.) SALE: the ratio of sales concentration by the biggest 5 firms in each industry. 
RETURN: the rate of profits over total assets. EXIM: The degree of international 
competition defined by the formulation [import/(domestic product + import - export) + 
export/(domestic product + import)]. DEBT: the outstanding debt per total assets. 
OWNER: the proportion of shares owned by largest 12 shareholders. FOREIGN: the 
proportion of shares held by foreigners. FINST: the proportion of shares held by 
financial institutions. CORP: the proportion of shares held by non-financial companies. 
















 18Table 2: Comparison between the firms with stable main bank relationship and th
  with unstable main bank relationship (%: standard deviations in parentheses) 
    
   With stable main banks With unstable main banks 
1957-1970  NOFirms  465 268 
 RVAD  17.8 (21.6) 18.1 (24.0) 
 CAPITAL   3.4 ( 6.8) 2.9 ( 7.1) 
 LABOR   4.1 ( 9.7) 4.1 (10.6) 
 SALE  78.5 (19.0) 74.0 (20.6) 
 RETURN  3.3 ( 3.0) 3.3 ( 3.0) 
 DEBT  69.3 (13.4) 67.1 (15.4) 
1971-1980  NOFirms  452 282 
 RVAD   9.3 (25.7) 10.9 (26.5) 
 CAPITAL   2.4 ( 6.4) 2.5 ( 7.5) 
 LABOR  -1.1 ( 7.8) -0.6 ( 8.2) 
 SALE   54.7 (18.1) 54.4 (19.7) 
 RETURN  0.3 ( 3.0) 0.6 ( 2.9) 
 EXIM  15.5 ( 8.3) 14.6 ( 7.4) 
 DEBT  73.8 (15.6) 68.7 (19.2) 
 OWNER  46.5 (15.2) 50.9 (14.8) 
 FOREIGN  2.4 ( 6.3) 3.0 ( 8.4) 
1981-1990  NOFirms  517 324 
 RVAD  7.5 (21.5) 8.1 (22.3) 
 CAPITAL  1.5 ( 5.3) 1.7 ( 8.2) 
 LABOR  0.0 ( 5.7) 0.5 ( 5.5) 
 SALE   60.6 (20.1) 59.6 (20.5) 
 RETURN  0.8 ( 2.3) 1.0 ( 2.3) 
 EXIM  20.0 (12.7) 18.6 (10.1) 
 DEBT  66.7 (17.1) 62.2 (21.2) 
 OWNER  45.9 (13.2) 50.1 (13.8) 
 FOREIGN  5.1 ( 8.0) 4.6 ( 8.5) 
 FINST  35.9 (15.6) 28.2 (15.0) 
 CORP  27.7 (17.2) 32.8 (20.1) 
 PERSON  28.7 (13.3) 32.3 (20.1) 
1991-1996  NOFirms  516 329 
 RVAD  1.9 (15.9) 2.1 (16.3) 
 CAPITAL  1.9 ( 6.2) 1.6 ( 9.4) 
 LABOR  -0.9 ( 5.1) -0.6 ( 5.2) 
 SALE  63.9 (21.0) 60.4 (20.6) 
 RETURN  0.2 ( 2.2) 0.4 ( 2.2) 
 EXIM  22.2 (15.3) 20.1 (11.3) 
 DEBT  62.6 (17.0) 56.7 (20.5) 
 OWNER  45.1 (12.5) 49.7 (13.8) 
 FOREIGN  5.7 ( 7.7) 5.0 (8.5) 
 FINST  38.7 (15.2) 30.7 (15.5) 
 CORP  27.7 (16.4) 34.0 (19.2) 
 PERSON  26.2 (11.7) 28.8 (13.2) 
 19Table 3: Factors influencing on per-capita RVAD growth (t-statistics) 
Period 2  Period3   Period  1 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (3)
SALE  -4.20***  -0.20  -0.28   0.78   0.91   0.85 
RETURN 19.75***  18.95*** 18.83*** 8.91*** 8.77***  8.98***
EXIM   3.55*** 3.58*** 5.18*** 5.07***  5.26***
DEBT  5.52***  1.27    1.72*   0.15   0.58   0.05 
OWNER   2.87***     1.93*   
FOREIGN    2.74***    2.20** 
FINST         -2.18**
CORP    
PERSON    
MAIN  -0.39  -0.64  -1.00    -1.81*     -2.37**    -1.45 
Adst.R2 0.090  0.053 0.053 0.054 0.054  0.054
SER 21.42  26.44 26.43 21.77 21.77  21.77
LM het.test  27.48  42.26 43.18 34.89 32.91  36.99
NOB 9,804  7,336 7,336 10,117 10,117  10,117
NOFirms 959  962 962 1,347 1,347  1,347
 
 Period  4 
(4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 0.79   0.78   0.60   0.64   0.65   0.53   0.62 
8.83*** 8.87*** 8.33*** 8.29*** 8.38*** 8.16*** 8.33***
5.23*** 5.20*** 3.52*** 3.38*** 3.52*** 3.43*** 3.52***
 0.34   0.38  3.44*** 3.94*** 3.44*** 3.76***  3.47***
   -0.90   
   4.76***  
     -0.37   
 0.00    -3.04*** 
   0.59     0.52 
  -2.23**    -2.12**   -0.52   -0.59   -0.14  -0.81   -0.18 
0.054 0.054 0.054 0.056 0.054 0.055 0.054
21.77 21.77 17.27 17.26 17.28 17.26 17.27
34.27 35.20  5.64 12.23 5.69 6.00  5.63
10,117 10,117  8,109 8,109 8,109 8,109  8,109
1,347 1,347 1,579 1,579 1,579 1,579 1,579
(Notes) The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate the explanatory variables are significant at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table4：Growth in per capita RVAD and factors of corporate governance （absolute values of t-statistics in 
parentheses) 
  Period 1  Period 2  Period 3     
    (1) (2) (1) (2) (3) 
SALE  -0.059 (2.630)***  -0.025 ( 0.826)  -0.031 ( 1.042)  -0.001 ( 0.036)  -0.001 ( 0.052)  -0.003 (0.096) 
    M A I N     0.012 ( 0.459)  -0.012 ( 0.322)    0.005 ( 0.128)    0.006 ( 0.187)    0.012 ( 0.356)    0.010 ( 0.317) 
PROFIT  1.606(10.318)***    1.342( 6.900)*** 1.307 ( 6.744)*** 0.743 ( 3.639)***  0.710 ( 3.507)*** 0.706 ( 3.472)***
    M A I N   -0.183 ( 1.002)*  0.750 ( 3.143)*** 0.782 ( 3.285)***   0.396 ( 1.579)    0.420 ( 1.682)*  0.455 ( 1.813)* 
EXIM   0.236 ( 3.021)*** 0.227 ( 2.909)*** 0.182 ( 3.332)***  0.179 ( 3.270)*** 0.185 ( 3.392)***
    M A I N    -0.080 ( 0.875)  -0.065 ( 0.709)  -0.119 ( 1.863)*  -0.123 ( 1.926)*  -0.119 ( 1.880)**
DEBT      0.083 (2.696)**   0.014 ( 0.475)    0.042 ( 1.388)    0.008 ( 0.324)    0.0159 ( 0.658)    0.0136 ( 0.559)
    M A I N       0.019 (0.489)    0.006 ( 0.155)  -0.020 ( 0.498)    -0.005 ( 0.152)  -0.006 ( 0.192)  -0.012 ( 0.344) 
OWNER     0.088 ( 2.246)**   0.040 ( 1.004) 
    M A I N    -0.039 ( 0.824)    0.032 ( 0.647) 
FOREIGN    0.202 ( 2.920)***    0.068 ( 1.093) 
    M A I N     -0.190 ( 2.012)**    0.055 ( 0.706) 
FINST        0.015 ( 0.401) 
    M A I N       -0.053 ( 1.191) 
CORP    
    M A I N     
PERSON    
    M A I N     
CONST.      -0.081 ( 0.606)    -0.062 ( 0.424)    0.0340 ( 0.263) -0.487 ( 3.195)*** -0.432 ( 3.333)*** -0.431 ( 3.087)***
    M A I N       -0.103 ( 0.620)      0.095 ( 0.514)   0.081 ( 0.485)  -0.014 ( 0.072)      0.028 ( 0.170)    0.144 ( 0.812) 
Adjusted R2  0.0883 0.0657 0.0658 0.0560 0.0561 0.0560 
F Value  1.0200 2.1687+  2.8390+  1.5518 1.7970 1.8597 
Table4: (Continued)   
   Period  4   
(4)  (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  -0.002 ( 0.073)  -0.003 ( 0.109)    0.006 ( 0.248)    0.002 ( 0.079)    0.006 ( 0.255)    0.006 ( 0.242)    0.003 ( 0.123) 
  0.009 ( 0.270)    0.010 ( 0.311)  -0.000 ( 0.012)    0.005 ( 0.165)  0.002    ( 0.075)    0.000 ( 0.017)    0.005 ( 0.170) 
  0.712 ( 3.498)***  0.723 ( 3.564)***  0.973 ( 4.810)*** 0.984 ( 4.907)*** 0.984 ( 4.870)***  0.970 ( 4.801)*** 0.976 ( 4.865)***
  0.428 ( 1.710)*    0.371 ( 1.479)    0.191 ( 0.771)  0.194 ( 0.786)  0.199 ( 0.803)  0.195 ( 0.786)  0.211 ( 0.855) 
  0.183 ( 3.361)***    0.186( 3.379)***   0.0509 ( 1.185)   0.042 ( 0.978)    0.051 ( 1.188)    0.0511 ( 1.183)    0.0534 ( 1.240)
-0.115 ( 1.813)**  -0.121 ( 1.893)*    0.009 ( 0.181)    0.016 ( 0.322)    0.011 ( 0.217)    0.005 ( 0.108)    0.011 ( 0.215) 
  0.013 ( 0.526)    0.012 ( 0.488)    0.064 (2.780)*** 0.075 ( 3.217)*** 0.062 ( 2.669)***  0.064 ( 2.759)*** 0.066 ( 2.896)***
-0.011 ( 0.316)  -0.005 ( 0.143)    0.003 ( 0.080)  -0.002 ( 0.066)  0.004 ( 0.133)    0.004 ( 0.122)    0.003 ( 0.088) 
     0.003 ( 0.090)   
     -0.069 ( 1.495)   
      0.138 ( 2.420)**  
    -0.002 ( 0.368)   
      -0.016 ( 0.501) 
      0.022 ( 0.539) 
-0.007 ( 0.270)       0.001 ( 0.043) 
  0.045 ( 1.248)     -0.042 ( 1.231) 
 -0.027 ( 0.804)    -0.042 ( 1.177) 
 -0.044 ( 1.000)    -0.002 ( 0.041) 
-0.395 ( 3.020)***  -0.353 ( 2.540)**  -0.531 ( 3.039)*** -0.568 ( 4.000)*** -0.485 ( 3.048)*** -0.523 ( 3.544)*** -0.446 ( 2.893)***
-0.005 ( 0.028)    0.104 ( 0.596)    0.140 ( 0.613)  -0.098 ( 0.534)  -0.130 ( 0.630)    0.008 ( 0.044)  -0.093 ( 0.473) 
0.0558  0.0551 0.0792 0.0803 0.0782 0.0789 0.0784 
2.1413+ 1.8351 0.3839 0.1845 0.2751 0.4992 0.1252 
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Table 5 : Data of the firms in financial distress (%: standard deviations 
in parentheses) 
 
   Firms in financial distress    






1st sub-  NOFirms  87 25 21  872
period  RVAD  15.66 (38.28) 14.31 ( 2.82) 17.38 (50.82)  18.17 (22.14)
(1956-70)  CAPITAL    2.21 ( 8.90) 3.10 ( 7.46) 1.05 ( 5.92)  3.22 ( 6.82)
 LABOR    2.49 (11.11) 2.92 ( 9.92) 1.78 (11.49)  4.07 (10.11)
 SALE  76.22 (18.86) 78.89 (16.86) 70.10 (19.50)  76.31 (20.17)
 RETURN    2.53 (3.13) 2.84 ( 3.52) 2.58 ( 3.25)  3.29 ( 2.99) 
 DEBT  76.74 (14.85) 75.15 (15.52) 77.35 (15.80)  68.41 (14.01)
2nd sub-  NOFirms  70 20 16  900
period  RVAD  9.42 (74.76) 5.49 (95.86) 11.58 (50.71)  10.21 (25.16)
(1971-80)  CAPITAL    0.67 ( 5.94)   0.01 ( 5.24) 0.60 ( 5.83)    2.46 ( 7.02)
 LABOR  -3.43 ( 8.79) -4.97 ( 7.78) -2.69 ( 8.05)  -0.82 ( 7.93)
 SALE  52.16 (18.36) 53.85 (15.93) 52.10 (21.44)  54.15 (19.00)
 RETURN    -0.23 (3.17) -0.90 ( 3.37) 0.18 ( 2.94)  0.48 ( 2.91)
 EXIM  14.93 (9.18) 16.88 ( 9.65) 14.75 (12.80)  15.08 ( 7.83)
 DEBT  91.49 (21.39) 88.86 (18.76) 92.38 (26.23)  70.94 (16.69)
 OWNER  56.04 (16.15) 51.05 (15.45) 60.04 (15.41)  48.25 (14.89)
 FOREIGN  1.76 ( 5.75) 0.67 ( 1.69) 0.58 ( 1.48)    2.81 ( 7.58)
3rd sub-  NOFirms  93 26 21  1257
period  RVAD  6.77 (41.90) 6.53 (40.38) 2.11 (32.19)    8.69 (21.58)
(1981-90)  CAPITAL  -0.41 ( 5.99) -0.58 ( 5.28) -0.72 ( 4.33)    1.73 ( 6.70)
 LABOR  -1.06 ( 8.10) -0.67 ( 7.19) -1.33 ( 7.51)    0.50 ( 5.79)
 SALE  59.21 (20.17) 60.46 (16.59) 55.60 (20.81)  59.88 (20.69)
 RETURN  0.59 ( 2.36) 0.49 ( 2.61) 0.69 ( 1.99)    1.01 ( 2.31)
 EXIM  21.38 (15.21) 22.60 (13.95) 19.84 (17.03)  19.37 (11.69)
 DEBT  80.70 (19.42) 77.96 (17.86) 80.29 (16.54)  63.24 (18.90)
 OWNER  56.86 (13.57) 52.60 (14.05) 59.46 (12.50)  48.36 (13.65)
 FOREIGN  2.79 (6.03) 2.71 ( 5.71) 1.89 ( 3.56)    4.81 ( 8.33)
 FINST  20.33 (13.83) 27.31 (14.99) 14.79 ( 9.79)  31.38 (15.46)
 CORP  45.11 (18.08) 38.10 (17.36) 51.71 (16.44)  29.81 (18.45)
 PERSON  28.60 (12.91) 28.14 (11.70) 28.87 (13.00)  31.76 (15.14)
4th sub-  NOFirms  80 26 21  1503
period  RVAD  -0.15 (31.36) 1.64 (27.72) -0.74 (20.15)    2.63 (17.25)
(1991-96)  CAPITAL  -0.42 ( 5.50) 0.51 ( 4.61) -0.02 ( 3.70)    1.81 ( 7.88)
 LABOR  -2.98 (10.73) -1.80 (10.03) -2.44 ( 8.01)  -0.26 ( 5.45)
 SALE  65.33 (19.93) 65.90 (18.58) 64.61 (18.66)  60.98 (21.38)
 RETURN  -0.20 ( 2.14) -0.21 ( 2.18) -0.32 ( 1.98)    0.47 ( 2.23)
 EXIM  23.62 (17.66) 24.35 (14.57) 20.65 (16.79)  21.25 (14.25)
 DEBT  70.59 (21.38) 72.58 (15.19) 69.41 (18.86)  56.69 (19.40)
 OWNER  53.93 (14.03) 49.84 (13.36) 56.49 (13.40)  50.05 (14.22)
 FOREIGN  2.89 ( 4.95) 3.85 ( 5.67) 1.33 ( 3.02)    5.39 ( 8.44)
 FINST  22.12 (14.38) 28.79 (15.17) 16.46 (10.25)  31.04 (15.63)
 CORP  43.74 (17.58) 37.21 (15.27) 49.41 (17.47)  30.79 (18.10)




  22Table 6: Growth in per capita RVAD and factors of corporate governance : The case of financial distress 
(absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses) 
  Period 1  Period 2  Period 3     
    (1)  (2) (1) (2)  (3) 
SALE  -0.241 (1.053)    0.030 ( 0.107)    0.094 ( 0.347)  -0.072 ( 0.461)  -0.054 ( 0.343)  -0.060 ( 0.381) 
    M A I N     0.211 ( 0.812)    0.006 ( 0.010)  -0.048 ( 0.076)    0.316 ( 1.235)    0.312 ( 1.216)    0.320 ( 1.235) 
PROFIT    2.114 ( 1.678) *    3.680(1.987) **    3.765 (2.060) **   0.844 ( 0.631)    0.749 ( 0.560)    0.814 ( 0.607) 
    M A I N   -0.675 ( 0.489)    4.781 (1.646) *    5.122 (1.757) *    1.360 ( 0.744)    1.547 ( 0.850)    1.497 ( 0.820) 
EXIM     0.542 ( 1.086)    0.496 ( 1.020)    0.166 ( 0.833)    0.151 ( 0.752)    0.169 ( 0.822) 
    M A I N    -0.869 ( 0.900)  -0.916 ( 0958)  -0.073 ( 0.228)  -0.093 ( 0.295)  -0.110 ( 0.342) 
DEBT    - 0.166 ( 0.636)  -0.282 ( 1.474)  -0.266 ( 1.375)  -0.524 ( 3.158)***  -0.496(3.133)*** -0.487 ( 3.024)***
    M A I N       0.462 ( 1.579)    0.556 ( 1.219)  -0.627 ( 1.373)    0.250 ( 0.970)    0.224 (0.889)    0.222 ( 0.850) 
OWNER     0.107 ( 0.281)    0.189 ( 0.754) 
    M A I N      0.156 ( 0.237)  -0.081 ( 0.230) 
FOREIGN      3.257 ( 0.980)     1.081 ( 1.381) 
    M A I N     -7.716 ( 1.347)   -0.817 ( 0.900) 
FINST        0.014 ( 0.045) 
    M A I N         0.008 ( 0.021) 
CORP    
    M A I N     
PERSON    
    M A I N     
Const.    0.560 ( 1.092)      0.097 ( 0.143)    0.091 ( 0.158)    0.940 ( 1.254)    1.179 ( 1.771) *    1.193 ( 1.652) *
    M A I N   -1.355 ( 1.893)*      0.647 ( 0.696)    0.855 ( 1.077)  -0.973 ( 1.002)  -1.078 ( 1.270)  -1.123 ( 1.177) 
Adjusted R2  0.0486  0.1031  0.1074 0.0330 0.0348  0.0296 
F Value  1.3568  1.2048  1.5167 0.3897 0.4100  0.3175 
Table 6: Continued   
   Period  4   
(4)  (5)  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
-0.064 ( 0.401)  -0.070 ( 0.444)  -0.143 ( 1.229)  -0.125 ( 1.035)  -0.187 ( 1.524)  -0.148 ( 1.267)    0.123 ( 0.998) 
  0.320 ( 1.241)    0.350 ( 1.358)    -0.013 ( 0.067)    0.004 ( 0.021)    0.061 ( 0.319)  -0.011 ( 0.059)    0.042 ( 0.218) 
  0.804 ( 0.600)    0.764 ( 0.569)  2.617 ( 2.780)***   2.581 ( 2.737)***  2.768  (  2.921)***   2.780(2.937)***  2.668  (2.817)***
  1.378 ( 0.754)    1.335 ( 0.730)  -1.378 ( 0.917)  -1.427 ( 0.959)  -1.413 ( 0.938)  -1.317 ( 0.880)  -1.549 (1.044) 
  0.169 ( 0.838)    0.183 ( 0.905)    0.007 ( 0.051)    0.030 ( 0.230)    0.005 ( 0.037)  -0.011 ( 0.080)    0.009 ( 0.065) 
-0.096 ( 0.303)  -0.074 ( 0.231)  -0.024 ( 0.101)    0.067 ( 0.252)  -0.022 ( 0.093)  -0.041 ( 0.171)    0.006 ( 0.024) 
-0.493 (2.994)***  -0.508 (3.115)***    0.142 ( 1.070)    0.070 (0.603)    0.103 ( 0.881)    0.148 (1.133)    0.110 (0.831) 
  0.201 ( 0.774)    0.263 ( 1.029)    0.447 (2.034) **   0.491 (2.300) **   0.507 (2.393) **    0.475 (2.165) **   0.458(2.071) **
   -0.177 ( 0.953)   
     0.056 ( 0.196)   
    -0.364 ( 0.484)   
    -0.068 ( 0.077)   
      0.247 ( 1.108) 
    -0.058 ( 0.196) 
  0.021 ( 0.113)     -0.154 ( 1.087) 
  0.102 ( 0.374)     -0.110 ( 0.464) 
 -0.128 ( 0.525)      0.107 ( 0.479) 
 -0.183 ( 0.484)      0.078 ( 0.245) 
1.188 (1.727) *    1.418 ( 1.862)*    0.333 ( 0.470)  -0.040 ( 0.066)  -0.166 ( 0.264)    0.218 ( 0.337)    -0.376 ( 0.387) 
-1.168 ( 1.331)  -1.178 ( 1.278)  -1.400 ( 1.369)  -1.336 ( 1.611)  -1.496 ( 1.647) *  -1.194 ( 1.334)    -1.080 ( 0.953) 
0.0312  0.0324  0.0500  0.0517 0.0550 0.0580  0.0509 
0.3891  0.5057  1.3626  2.0970 1.9168 1.4290  2.0637 
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Table 7: Structural changes in the RVAD function between truncated sample period 
(Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses) 
Between period 1 and 2  Between period 1 and 3   
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
SALE 










   D U M T  









   D U M T  









   D U M T  
 0.034  (1.150) 
-0.011 (0.326) 
 0.036  (1.220) 
-0.003 (0.088) 





   D U M T  
0.069 (2.169)* 
-0.045 (1.162) 




   D U M T  
   0.006  (0.096) 
 0.130  (1.792)* 
 -0.013  (0.199) 
0.027 (0.354) 
MAIN 



















Adjusted R2  0.0645 0.0659 0.0619 0.0608 
F-Value  8.202 8.960 16.544  15.696 
(Notes) DUMT presents a cross term between each explanatory variable and the dummy 
for a specific sample period. Period 1, 2, and 3 are the early 1970s (1971-1974), the 
early 1980s (1981-1985), and the late 1980s (1985-1989) respectively.
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